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This thesis is a guide to the eviction landscape in South Carolina, produced with three main 
audiences in mind: organizers, researchers, and policymakers. It seeks to address three related 
questions. First, where are evictions happening? How do they cluster geographically, and what 
conclusions can we draw from these patterns? Second, who or what responsible for the crisis? What 
are the main correlates, and how can geospatial statistics shed light on the issue? And finally, how 
can the South Carolinian crisis be placed within the framework of radical geography and 
understood in a wider context? 
Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze the South Carolinian eviction crisis from the 
perspective of radical geography. South Carolina was chosen for the severity of its crisis and the 
lack of research at a sub-state level. Court records of eviction filings from 2019 were geocoded and 
tested for spatial clustering, which was clearly visible. Plaintiff names were used to identify the 
most frequent filers and distinguish landlords by type. At the census tract level, eviction filing 
counts were compared with neighborhood characteristics using negative binomial regression, and 
most were found to be significant in South Carolina. To better capture spatial variation in how 
eviction filings may be best explained, the paper introduces Geographically Weighted Regression 
(GWR) to the field of eviction research. This novel approach is shown to be useful at identifying 
the interactions between eviction and localized housing markets, although it was not established as 
statistically stronger that linear regression. Finally, this report urges a reorientation of eviction 





“They will talk of giving compensation to the landlords, of preparing statistics, 
and drawing up long reports. Yes, they would be capable of drawing up reports 
long enough to outlast the hopes of the people.” 
—Pyotr Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread, 1906 
 
The eviction crisis is not new, but the intensity of scholarly attention to it is. Beginning with the 
publication of Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City by Matthew Desmond, this 
attention has focused on the understanding of eviction as a cause, not simply a result, of poverty 
(2016). More than just a traumatic experience, eviction causes children to do worse in school, 
parents to be at a higher risk of losing their jobs, and all family members to be more likely to 
become involved with the criminal justice system (Hatch & Yun 2020). By 2021, the urgent need 
for a solution had been made startlingly clear by the COVID-19 pandemic: a working paper from 
the National Bureau of Economic Research found that stronger limits on eviction could have 
resulted in a 40.7 percent reduction in COVID-19 deaths in the United States (Jowers et al. 2021). 
It is hard to characterize the eviction crisis as anything less than “social murder” (Engels 2009). 
But this crisis is not geographically uniform. In fact, the contrasts between regions, states, and 
localities mean that it is necessary to confirm the applicability of findings to each local context. 
Using radical geography as a framework, researchers can fit eviction into a larger story of twenty-
first century capitalism and displacement (Smith 2002).   
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Background and Literature Review 
Eviction is a defining feature of housing markets. As pointed out by Sims (2016), the very fact that 
evictions are spatially concentrated is evidence that they are not simply the result of tenants’ failures 
or bad decisions, but rather the result of external or systemic factors. It is part of the relationship 
between tenants and landlords that can be traced back to feudalism (Schmidt 2017). The conflict 
between landlords and peasants was initially chaotic and excessively violent, so successive English 
kings sought to formalize and systematize the right of landlords to recover property “taken” by 
tenants who failed to pay rent (Schmidt 2017). During the Industrial Revolution, this feudal 
relationship was adapted to fit the commodification of housing (Engels 2009; Soederberg 2018). 
Tenancy was reclassified as a contract between equal parties, but without addressing the underlying 
power imbalance between landlord and renter, which remained the basic justification for eviction 
(Schmidt 2017). To quote from Nelson, Garboden, et alia (2021): 
“It is important to view eviction as a process reflecting a set of social relations, 
rather than a singular… event. To imply otherwise would be to suggest that the 
relationship between landlord and tenant is purely one of financial exchange and 
not—as economic sociologists have described—an economically articulated, 
institutionally mediated, social relationship.” 
Today, eviction is the “stick” with which landlords extract rent, or failing that, harass, exploit, or 
remove their tenants (Huq and Harwood 2019; Garboden and Rosen 2019; Balzarini and Boyd 
2020). It is therefore essential to the functioning of the landlord-tenant relationship. Without 
eviction, it would be impossible for landlords to harass, exploit, or remove their tenants, and 
ultimately, impossible for them to continue to demand rent. Removal, however, is only the most 
extreme possible outcome; landlords (especially in South Carolina) routinely file with an 
expectation that the tenant will pay back their debts at some point before the case is resolved 
(Garboden and Rosen 2019; Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). The filing is meant to scare or 
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threaten tenants with the possibility of removal (Garboden and Rosen 2019; Moore 2020a; Leung, 
Hepburn, and Desmond 2020), while simultaneously making such a move more difficult for the 
tenant, since they will now have to find a landlord who will tolerate an eviction record (Kleysteuber 
2007; Desmond 2012; Rosen 2014; Humphries et al. 2019; Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020). 
This combines to create a powerful incentive for the tenant to pay back the rent and try to remain 
in the home they still have (Garboden and Rosen 2019). As a bonus, landlords often use eviction 
as an opportunity to impose late fees and bill tenants for court fees, adding an average of $180 on 
top of rent (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020; Moore 2020a). Marking tenants with a “Scarlet 
E”, so to speak, serves a larger purpose beyond the immediate one of charging fees and collecting 
rent (Desmond 2016). Tenants with a record form a captive market, allowing landlords to “milk” 
deteriorating properties for high rents (Smith 1979; Desmond and Wilmers 2019; Teresa and 
Howell 2020). 
Because eviction is an outcome of housing market dynamics, researchers over the past decade have 
made great progress in predicting eviction using neighborhood characteristics.1 These can broadly 
be divided into population characteristics, housing characteristics, landlord characteristics, and the 
legal environment (see Figure 6). Population characteristics have been the most widely studied, and 
almost all studies in this area include some measure of race and income (e.g., Desmond 2012; 
Medina et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021). Other factors identified over the years include 
children as a percent of the total population (Desmond et al. 2013; Goodspeed, Benton, and Slugg 
2021), single-mother households as a percent of all households (Desmond 2012; Goodspeed, 
Benton, and Slugg 2021), and several other metrics of concentrated disadvantage (Desmond and 
 
1 Because of its documented use as a gentrification tactic (e.g., Huq and Harwood 2019; Mah 2020), 
eviction’s relationship to gentrification on a neighborhood level has been an issue of longstanding scholarly 
interest. While some researchers have found success with novel methods and/or redefined terms (Chum 
2015; Laniyonu 2019), in general the relationship appears ambiguous at best and is most likely too 
localized to be captured with areal units (Freeman 2005; Desmond 2012; Desmond and Gershenson 2017; 
Lens et al. 2020; Mah 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021).  
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Gershenson 2017; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021). The central role of landlord 
characteristics is beginning to be understood, as corporate property managers, large property 
managers, and even subsidized housing contribute disproportionately to the crisis (Smith 2002; 
Raymond et al. 2016, 2018; Huq and Harwood 2019; Immergluck et al. 2019; Balzarini and Boyd 
2020; Teresa and Howell 2020; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021). The effects of 
housing characteristics appear to be more complex, since factors like median rent may have 
nonlinear effects (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). But vacancy, low home values, and the 
median year rental properties were built have all been shown to be significant (Desmond and 
Gershenson 2017; Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 
2021; Medina et al. 2021).  
From a methodological standpoint, geospatial statistics have become an increasingly important part 
of eviction research. The first law of geography is that “everything is usually related to all else but 
those which are near to each other are more related when compared to those that are further away” 
(Tobler 1970). A study that treats neighborhoods as isolated observations will miss a significant 
part of the picture. Even research that does not explicitly incorporate geostatistical methods is 
usually confined to the local or regional scale, as exemplified by the sources cited above. To some 
extent, this has been a practical consideration—the collection of nationwide data is notoriously 
difficult (Desmond et al. 2018). But most researchers have come to recognize the theoretical 
problems involved in comparing areas with different legal procedures and recordkeeping practices 
(Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021). A few have gone further, taking the statistical methods developed 
by geographers to account for spatial proximity. One method is to adjust for spatial autocorrelation, 
meaning the clustering of similar dependent variables (Raymond et al. 2016; Medina et al. 2020). 
Another method is to account for spillover effects, or the impact one place’s independent variables 
have on neighboring places (Laniyonu 2019; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021). 
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Despite these strides that have been made towards modeling eviction, there are still major gaps in 
our understanding. Different areas will have similar eviction rates for different reasons (Sims 2019). 
Some attempts have been made to study how the correlates of eviction differ between housing 
markets, but the process of delineating markets has been manual (Goodspeed et al. 2021). In this 
paper, I introduce a geostatistical method that can automatically recognize and account for differing 
local dynamics. Since being created by Brunsdon, Fotheringham, and Charlton in a 1996 paper, 
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) has been widely and effectively used in the field of 
housing research (e.g., Bitter, Mulligan, and Dall’erba 2007; Borst and McCluskey 2008; 
Manganelli et al. 2014). Rather than trying to predict the eviction count in all tracts using a model 
fitted to the whole study area, GWR predicts each tract’s eviction count with a unique regression 
equation that has been fitted using only nearby tracts. This makes identifying and accounting for 
local housing market dynamics substantially easier. For example, in order to understand the 
differing local importance of median rent visa-vis the eviction crisis, researchers could map the 
coefficients for median rent that GWR generates for each local regression equation. Where the 
magnitude of the coefficient is larger, median rent plays a bigger role in the regression model. Each 
localized interaction between eviction and housing markets can be understood on its own terms, 
without necessarily knowing the size or shape of the relevant housing markets in advance. In theory, 
this will also lead to far more accurate predictions.  
In addition to investigating the effectiveness of this technique when applied to eviction, this study 
also applies more established techniques in the process of describing and analyzing South 
Carolina’s eviction landscape. As mentioned, the variation in the factors contributing to the eviction 
crisis is such that findings from one region may not be applicable to others (Nelson, Garboden, et 
al. 2021). It is necessary, therefore, to validate the conclusions drawn from analyses of other states 
by repeating those methodologies here. This will include a Getis-Ord Gi* Hot Spot analysis and a 
negative binomial regression model (cf., Sims 2016; Medina et al. 2021; Leung, Hepburn, and 
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Desmond 2020; Medina et al. 2020; Goodspeed, Benton, and Slugg 2021; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 
20212).  My goal in this endeavor is to help researchers, policymakers, and tenant organizers in 
South Carolina understand the general landscape of eviction in the state and apply that knowledge 
towards combating the crisis. 
South Carolina’s Eviction Laws and Eviction Process 
In 2016, Princeton’s Eviction Lab estimated the eviction rate as almost double that of the next 
highest state (Desmond et al. 2018). The legal environment around eviction plays a crucial role in 
explaining why South Carolina has such a high eviction rate overall. Although South Carolina is 
classified as having a “contradictory” landlord-tenant legal environment in general (that is, having 
some laws that favor tenants and others that favor landlords), research has shown that it is precisely 
these states where eviction rates are the highest (Hatch 2017; Merritt and Farnworth 2020). The 
exact reasons for this remain uncertain, but in South Carolina, it appears to be due to a combination 
of lack of enforcement of pro-tenant laws and the fact that laws around eviction are almost 
uniformly pro-landlord (see Table 1; Moore 2020b; Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021). Lack of 
enforcement of pro-tenant laws is a common problem stemming from the structure and culture of 
eviction courts, arising as they did as a way of enforcing the property rights of landlords (Bezdek 
1992; Schmidt 2017; Summers 2019). So-called “pro-tenant” laws are usually defensive, because 
there is no equivalent to eviction for a tenant seeking to enforce their side of the contract. South 
Carolina also has limited legal resources for tenants who wish to fight in court. South Carolina 










Table 1: Comparison of Eviction Laws in South Carolina and Neighboring States 
State Time between 









South Carolina5 5 days (see below) $40 10 days6 No ~6 days 
North Carolina7 10 days $96 Automatic No 10 days 
Georgia8 Immediate ~$50 7 days No 7 days 
Tennessee9 14 days ~$175 Automatic No 10 days 
Alabama10 7 days ~$297 Varies No 7 days 
State Does offering/repaying rent 





South Carolina Up to 5 days after due Yes 26 days 
North Carolina No Yes 32 days 
Georgia Up to 7 days after filing Yes, as of July 2019 ~20 days 
Tennessee Up to 14 days after due Yes 36 days 
Alabama If accepted Yes ~41 days 
In South Carolina, the eviction process for nonpayment of rent (the most common reason for 
eviction) begins when the landlord gives a tenant five days’ notice that they are behind (Figure 1). 
However, a loophole in state law allows this notice to be bypassed if it is included in the lease. 
After five days, the landlord may file with the local Magistrate Court for $40. The low filing fee 
encourages repeat filings against the same tenant, a practice known as “serial” eviction (Garboden 
and Rosen 2019; Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020; Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021). The tenant 
 
3 Unlike South Carolina, most states allow filing fees to be set at the local level, so their fees are listed as 
approximate values (iPropertyManagement 2020) 
4 The minimum time between the hearing and the tenant being removed (iPropertyManagement 2020) 
5 S.C. Code Ann. § 27-37 and § 27-40 
6 There is some local variation. Local eviction lawyers explained that Bluffton, Beaufort, Spartanburg, and 
some courts in the Pee Dee area all schedule hearings automatically. 
7 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25 
8 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 44-7 
9 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-28 
10 Ala. Code § 35-9A 
11 iPropertyManagement 2020 
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then has ten days to vacate or “show cause”, i.e., request the court for a hearing. In most courts, if 
the tenant does not respond the landlord can simply request a writ of ejectment. A large portion of 
cases are settled or dismissed before the hearing. The parties often come to some sort of agreement 
or mutually stop pursuing the case. But landlords in South Carolina will sometimes go to court 
even if an agreement has been reached, just to keep the option of eviction open (Leung, Hepburn, 
and Desmond 2020). If both parties appear before the judge, generally the plaintiff is successful. 
The judge may rule for the defendant if there are extenuating circumstances, dismiss if the plaintiff 
stops pursuing the case, or sanction a settlement. Any of these recorded outcomes can obscure 
special conditions, agreements, or other details not in the record of the case (Table 2).  
Figure 1: The (Simplified) Eviction Process in South Carolina 
 
South Carolina does not have separate housing courts. Instead, eviction cases are heard in 
Magistrate Courts, usually as a bench trial. Parties can request a jury trial, but this study found that 



































culture is encouraged by the tradition of allowing local power-brokers (state senators) to 
recommend candidates for Magistrate to the Governor. It is exacerbated by the fact that the Court 
Bench Book does not require Magistrates to have a law degree or any background in landlord-
tenant law. Corruption is rampant, judges are almost never removed for disciplinary infractions 
(Cranney 2019). For decades, Magistrates routinely set unlawfully high bonds for appeal due to a 
misinterpretation (whether deliberate or otherwise) of the statute on civil appeals until an order 
from the South Carolina Supreme Court halted the practice in 2020 (Moore 2020b, 2020c). South 
Carolina’s habitability protections are rarely applied, in part due to their byzantine specifications. 
Tenants can pay for essential services and deduct the cost from rent if the landlord fails to provide 
them—but they cannot make repairs and deduct (S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-630). The court requires 
a level of documentation that is essentially unachievable for most tenants. In recognition of this, 
eviction lawyers in South Carolina generally advise tenants not to utilize even the limited rights 
they do have to withhold rent. Overall, the court records show that tenants won less than one out 




Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Eviction data for the years 2015-2020 was requested from the South Carolina Court Administration, 
which compiled records from the 319 Magistrate Courts that hear eviction cases around the state. 
A total of 801,202 records were received. Cases were removed if they lacked both a disposition 
and filing date or if the case status or disposition was marked as “transferred”, “rescheduled”, 
“void”, or “clearance”. This totaled to 5,382 cases (0.67% of cases) that were removed. Additional 
code was used to remove common typos, format the data in a usable way, and generate standardized 
fields.  
The standardized date was either the filing date, or if that was unavailable, the disposition date. 
Standardized property ownership, ownership type, and property name fields were parsed from the 
plaintiff’s name. Commonly, the plaintiff column contained the name of the plaintiff “DBA” 
(“doing business as”) the apartment complex. For Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
properties, public housing, and the largest private managers, an effort was made to identify and 
associate properties with the correct manager using apartment names and addresses. This was done 
using the free and open-source software OpenRefine. OpenRefine also helped identify and merge 
name variations or misspellings (e.g., “Chase E. Furnas, Co” and “Chase Furnas, Co”). The 
“plaintiff name” column was then split into property name and property owner columns. The 
Python library “cleanco” was used to help standardize property owner names. Ownership type was 
determined by first checking if the field “Plaintiff First” (i.e., first name) was filled. If it was, the 
filer was assumed to have been an individual. Then, any case where the property owner had 
“authority” in the name was marked as public housing12, and any case where the property name 
and property owner fields matched the list of LIHTC properties and owners was marked as such 
 
12 Units owned by public housing authorities were marked as having been filed by the appropriate 
authority, even if a professional management company had been used. 
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(these had been ensured to match by careful manual cleaning in OpenRefine). Finally, the 
remaining cases were marked as being from corporate filers. 
The defendant’s address was parsed using the Python library “usaddress”, and if a street address 
(as opposed to a PO box) was identified, it became the standardized address. If a street address 
could not be located or did not exist, the Magistrate court’s street address was used. This was done 
for 8,001 cases (1% of geocoded cases). To ensure that using court addresses for these cases did 
not distort the geographic distribution of the data, the hotspot analysis was conducted both with 
and without them, and results were nearly identical. Cases were geocoded using their standardized 
addresses, and 1,130 (0.14% of the total) were removed because the address was geocoded to a 
location outside of South Carolina or could not be located on the map. 794,690 cases were correctly 
geocoded. These cases were then aggregated into census tracts and block groups so that they could 
be compared with neighborhood characteristics. Tracts and block groups are two ways that the US 
Census divides the map of the country to efficiently collect and publish demographic data. Tracts 
are slightly larger, usually composed of about 4,000 people. Block groups are subdivisions of tracts, 
with populations of between 600 and 3,000 people. The analysis was performed at both levels to 
check for robustness, and the results were comparable. The final geographically weighted model 
performed slightly better at the tract level because margins of error for ACS data are lower, and 
more data (such as data from the Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy) was available. 
For that reason, this paper presents the tract-level analysis. Of the 1,103 census tracts in South 
Carolina, six unpopulated tracts were excluded from the analysis.  
This paper looks at eviction filings rather than evictions. Court records do not accurately show 
whether a set-out (i.e., an eviction) has occurred (Table 2). The closest approximation offered is 
that a “writ of ejectment” has been issued (Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020; Raymond et al. 
2016). Although all set-outs require a writ of ejectment to be issued first, it is very uncertain what 
portion of writs are ever executed. Local eviction lawyers and nonprofit representatives have 
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explained that until recently, many rental assistance programs in Greenville required tenants to 
show a writ of ejectment before they could qualify. Similar situations may or may not exist in other 
counties, but journalists have reported that some landlords in South Carolina repeatedly seek writs 
against the same tenant without executing any of them (Moore 2020a). Filing an eviction is so 
cheap in South Carolina that landlords seem to find it more profitable to use the extra writs as an 
arm-twisting tactic, rather than go through the hassle of turning over the unit. This makes the 
number of writs issued a poor approximation of evictions. 
Table 2: Potential outcomes of landlord-tenant disputes 
Result Definition Recorded Outcome 
No displacement (or 
no court-enforced 
displacement) 
The tenant stays in the property (or 
leaves for some other reason) 




The tenant leaves the property to 
avoid a hearing, expecting to be set 
out, or to end harassment in the 
form of repeated filings 
Any recorded outcome is 
possible. Also includes pre-
filing settlements where the 
tenant agrees to vacate the 
property 
Set-out/eviction The tenant is removed by the sheriff A variable subset of cases 
marked “find for plaintiff”, 
“default judgment”, or “writ of 
ejectment issued” 
 
Other factors complicate the issue still further. As scholars have noted, many instances of court-
enforced displacement occur without a writ ever being issued (Desmond and Shollenberger 2015; 
Desmond 2016; Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021). Although the strictest definitions would not include 
these as “evictions”, the outcome is essentially the same in terms of harm done to the tenant, 
especially in a state like South Carolina where all eviction filings are public record. And there is 
no official process for expungement. For these reasons, the count of eviction filings was deemed 
the most accurate and meaningful statistic that can be calculated with existing court records.   
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Figure 2: Eviction Filings in South Carolina (Jan 2015-Oct 2020) 
 
Figure 2 shows that the raw number of eviction filings has increased by around 7,000 over the past 
5 years, but the filing rate has remained steady at about 25 percent.13 If an upward trend does exist, 
it is very slight. As previously noted, this analysis will focus on 2019. All following graphs, figures, 
maps, and charts will refer to 2019 data unless otherwise noted. 
  
 
13 For the years of 2015 and 2016, these figures are inconsistent with those reported by the Princeton 
Eviction Lab (Desmond et al. 2018). This is due to differences in our data cleaning methods (see limitations 
























































Figure 3: Histogram of Census Tracts by Filing Count, 2019 
 
Using the filing count rather than filing rate made it possible to include tracts with very few 
estimated renter households. Descriptive statistics were calculated using the Data Analysis Toolpak 
in Excel. The results (Figure 3 and Table 3) indicate that eviction filings are right-skewed (the 
modal bin is 25-50 and the mean tract has a filing rate of 136.6). Sample variance is very high due 
to the wide range of possible filing counts. A not insignificant number of tracts contain over 500 
filings. This distribution has implications for the regression analyses later in this paper, since many 
regression models (e.g., ordinary least squares) assume a normally distributed data set.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Filing Count by Census Tract, 2019 
Mean 136.6 
Median 76 
Standard Error 5.3 
Standard Deviation 175 
Sample Variance 30648 
Kurtosis 11 
Skewness  3 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 1305 
























The growing importance of state action in displacement, and the influx of investor-owned rental 
properties following the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008, means that it is important to take 
a survey of exactly what actors are causing the eviction crisis (Smith 2002; Raymond et al. 2016, 
2018). Using the methods described above, plaintiffs were sorted into four broad categories: 
individuals (i.e., those filing under a person’s name), public housing authorities (whether filed 
under the name of the authority itself, a project, or a contracted management company), and 
LIHTC properties (carefully cross-referenced with a list provided by the South Carolina Housing 
Finance Authority). 
Figure 4: Types of Filers (Jan 2015-Oct 2020) 
 
 
Consistently with previous research, Figure 4 shows that corporate property managers file the vast 
majority of cases in South Carolina. Individual filers often own fewer properties, cannot afford 
vacancies, and prefer to reach an extrajudicial settlement rather than file an eviction (Balzarini and 





Corporations Individuals LIHTC Public Housing
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vacancies (Garboden and Rosen 2019). These managers claim to avoid out-of-court settlements 
because they are afraid of discrimination lawsuits, although research has yet to show whether this 
is a rationalization (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). While subsidized housing makes up 
nearly 20 percent of all occupied rental units, it only accounts for around 10 percent of eviction 
filings (Grady 2021). Although this might seem to imply that subsidized housing plays reduced 
role in the crisis, we should be cautious about drawing this conclusion. For one, figures are not 
available on the number of units managed by other types of landlords, so it may be possible that 
subsidized housing is only less prolific compared to corporate filers, but more prolific than 
individuals. Moreover, this does not preclude individual LIHTC properties or public housing 
authorities from playing an outsized role in the crisis. 
Table 4: Top 15 Evictors (Jan 2015-Oct 2020) 
Property Manager Type Total Eviction Filings 
Powers Properties Private 23,192 
InterMark Management Private 14,621 
Asset Management and Consulting Services (AMCS) Private 9,786 
Yes! Communities Private 9,136 
Southwood Realty Private 8,902 
Boyd Management Private 7,225 
Charleston Housing Authority Public 6,496 
DBC Real Estate Management Private 5,737 
First Communities Management Private 4,415 
Mid-America Apartment Communities Private 4,085 
Columbia Housing Authority Public 4,000 
Carroll Companies Private 3,861 
Roland Management Private 3,567 
Darby Development Private 3,401 
Gaffney Housing Authority Public 2,924 
Burlington Capital Private 2,903 
Morgan Properties Private 2,703 
Strategic Management Partners Private 2,678 
Stonemark Management Private 2,640 




Table 4 shows the entities that have filed the most evictions over the past five years. Three of the 
top fifteen were public housing authorities (Local Housing Authorities or LHAs), demonstrating 
that individual LHAs are major contributors to the crisis. In 2019, the Gaffney Housing Authority 
filed 655 evictions on only 274 units—a rate of 239 percent. Very few of these cases (64) had the 
outcome “find for plaintiff”, suggesting that the authority is using eviction as a rent collection 
method, much like private corporations do. Previous researchers working in South Carolina’s 
upstate have catalogued the class, racial, and gendered tensions between white male LHA officials 
and black female tenants, which are similar to tensions in the private market (Neary 2011; cf. 
Desmond 2016; Bezdek 1992). Moreover, LHAs often contract out management of their properties 
to the same corporations used by private landlords, like NHE management in Greenville (TGHA 
2021). The same is true for LIHTC properties: InterMark Management’s webpage boasts that “Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit apartments [make] up approximately one-half of InterMark’s current 
portfolio” (InterMark 2021). Neither public or privately owned subsidized units are immune to 
eviction, and they may even be leaders in producing this crisis. 
Some of these prolific evictors, such as Powers Properties, have been made notorious by the efforts 
of local media (Editorial Board 2020; Moore 2020a; Weissman, Smolcic Larson, and Norkol 2020; 
Weissman 2020). But most fly under the radar, filing hundreds or thousands of evictions each year 
without public scrutiny. Policymakers and tenant organizers have an opportunity to make a major 
impact on the overall crisis by targeting these top fifteen filers, which were responsible for 15.7 
percent of all evictions filed over the past five years in South Carolina. The top fifty filed 22.8 
percent, more than every individual put together. Local housing authorities and HUD should 
identify where public housing managers are using eviction as a rent collection tactic, and either 
change management companies or instruct them to change their practices. The South Carolina 
Housing Finance Authority can deny future LIHTC funds to property managers who are 
particularly prone to evicting their tenants and retroactively enact restrictions on current LIHTC 
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managers to stop excessive use of eviction. For organizers, these companies represent particularly 
important targets. Not only do they disproportionately afflict the lives of tenants, but residents in 
their properties might be especially inclined to fight back. 
Hot Spot Analysis 
To visualize the data, the eviction filing rate (filings per 100 renter households) was calculated. 
The estimate of renter households came from the ACS 5-year estimates for 2015-2019. If a tract 
had no rental housing units recorded, the filing rate was considered null. Twenty census tracts had 
a null filing rate (1.81% of the total). A hot spot analysis was then run using the namesake tool in 
ArcGIS Pro. A hot spot analysis identifies tracts which are part of clusters: tracts with above- or 
below-average filing rates surrounded by other tracts with similar rates. The null hypothesis is that 
high and low filing rates are randomly distributed, but if enough similar tracts are concentrated in 
a defined area, it will show up as a hot or cold spot (depending on whether the clustered values are 
low or high). For this map, that defined area was the twenty-three nearest tracts to any given tract. 
This definition yielded the highest overall Getis-Ord Gi* statistic, which represents the overall 
statistical significance of the map. These clusters in Figure 5 are statistically significant and are 
probably the result of spatial variables. 
There are eight distinct hot spot areas and four major cold spot areas. The hot spots are Sumter, 
Florence, North Charleston, Rock Hill, Gaffney, Spartanburg, south Greenville, and select suburbs 
of Columbia. The four cold spots are the coastal plain, downtown Columbia, the area west of Lake 
Murray, and the area around Lake Keowee. Other stray cold spots are scattered throughout the rural 






Figure 5: Getis-Ord Gi* Hot Spot Map of Eviction Filing Rates, 2019 
 
By consulting housing literature, we can begin to guess at the reasons for these clusters. For 
example, the cold spot along the coast may be related to the high cost of housing, itself the result 
of geographic constraints on housing (Allen and Lu 2003; Saiz 2010). Working class housing has 
been pushed inland. While the housing quality there is low, it is mostly single-family homes rented 
out on a small scale (Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000; Cline 2017). Corporate property managers 
have only just begun to penetrate the single-family rental market, and it does not appear that the 
South Carolina inland coastal plain has been a primary target (Raymond et al. 2016, 2018; see 
Appendix, Figure 21). The possibility of a relationship between eviction and heirs’ property—a 
unique feature of the Lowcountry’s housing market—is intriguing but as-of-yet unclear. Heirs’ 
property is the common property of two or more heirs created when the original owner died without 
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a will. It usually refers to a dwindling set of properties owned by the descendants of slaves who 
were able to accumulate this land during the decades following abolition. No comprehensive survey 
of heirs’ property exists, so it is difficult to analyze its relationship to eviction at the statewide scale 
(Finewood 2012; Grabbatin 2016; Kuris 2018). The one hot spot near the coast is in North 
Charleston. This is where working-class housing in the Charleston metro clusters, and where 
multifamily and corporate-owned housing is the rule (see Appendix, Figures 16 and 21). 
Both Greenville and Columbia have partial “rings” of hot spots formed by high-evicting suburbs. 
This reflects the extremely suburban-centric growth in South Carolina since the 1960s and the 
nationwide trend towards the suburbanization of poverty (Allen and Lu 2003; Kneebone and Garr 
2010). As a larger percentage of the population has come to reside in suburbs, these areas are no 
longer the exclusive purview of the upper or middle classes. The working class and poor live in 
suburbs too, although these are often segregated into separate neighborhoods (Kneebone and Garr 
2010). The suburbanization of poverty, it seems, has been followed by the suburbanization of 
eviction.  Elsewhere in the state, it is not immediately clear why some cities are hot spots while 
others are not. Notably missing from this map are cities like Orangeburg and North Augusta, which 
share many economic and geographical similarities with Sumter and Rock Hill respectively, both 
of which are hot spots. While spatial difference in eviction is obviously present, further analysis is 





Figure 6: Theoretical Model 
 
This paper will test whether it is possible to explain these trends by a combination of three out of 
the four factor-clusters found in past eviction research (Figure 6). Housing characteristics, 
population characteristics, and landlord characteristics are all included, but for reasons explained 
below, the legal environment was not operationalized in this study. 
The class struggle between landlord and tenant most often comes to a head over housing 
characteristics such as rent and habitability (Bezdek 1992; Desmond 2016). Population 
characteristics, like median income and race, generally indicate areas of concentrated disadvantage 
where evictions are clustered (Desmond 2016; Soederberg 2018; Desmond and Wilmers 2019; 
Medina et al. 2020; Merritt and Farnworth 2020; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021). 
Not only are residents of such neighborhoods more at risk of falling behind or facing 
discrimination, but eviction itself helps reproduce their systems of poverty and exploitation 
(Desmond 2012; Rosen 2014; Desmond and Shollenberger 2015; Desmond 2016; Sims 2019; 
Teresa and Howell 2020). Landlord characteristics refer to features like number of properties 
owned, ownership structure, or whether the landlord is part of a subsidized housing program. 
Larger, bureaucratized landlords have the ability and the will to use eviction more often and more 
universally (Raymond et al. 2016, 2018; Garboden and Rosen 2019; Huq and Harwood 2019; 














on whether a landlord thinks it is profitable to file a case, thus influencing the number of filings 
(Merritt and Farnworth 2020; Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021).   
All four factor-clusters interact internally and with one another. In particular, landlords have the 
ability to shape housing and population characteristics in the direction that is most profitable to 
them (Rosen 2014; Teresa and Howell 2020). They set rent, maintain, or neglect the property, and 
can even influence what sorts of properties are built through their collective demand. In turn, 
housing characteristics such as age and property value influence what types of landlords want to 
purchase and operate the property (Smith 1979). Population characteristics (especially those related 
to housing market strength) influence the kind of landlords who operate in a given area. For 
example, corporate property managers are more likely to locate in cities and are only a marginal 
part of rural housing markets (see Appendix, Figure 21). The legal environment is influenced by 
the relative political power of landlords and renters, which in turn is influenced by population 
characteristics. 
The legal environment was not operationalized in this analysis for theoretical and practical reasons. 
The theoretical reason is that South Carolina does not have as much eviction policy variation at a 
local level compared to other states. The filing fee is set by the state legislature and no localities 
have major eviction diversion programs. From a practical perspective, local differences that do 
exist are not well-documented and their significance is not yet attested to. Future research will 
hopefully yield better data on the differences between Magistrates’ courts. 
Table 5 lists the 26 variables used to operationalize the three other factor clusters. These variables 
were chosen based on those shown to be significant in previous research. For some concepts, like 
income, multiple variables were tested to determine the best possible operationalization. Those that 
were removed before the final analysis are marked. Most are drawn from the American Community 
Survey (ACS) five year estimates for 2015-2019. The 5-year estimates were used rather than the 
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1-year estimates because neighborhoods change very slowly, so lower margins of error were 
deemed more important than temporal precision. The habitability issues variable and the variables 
related to area median income (AMI) came from the Comprehensive Housing Affordability 
Strategy dataset for 2013-2017. A dummy variable for urbanity was generated based on whether a 
tract intersected with a census-defined city. Landlord characteristics were operationalized using the 
plaintiff’s name field in the court records. This field helped to determine the “ownership type” for 
each case, classified as either individual, LIHTC, public housing, or corporation. The percentage 
of all evictions filed by each type of landlord was calculated for each census tract. In general, these 
variables can be treated as a proxy for the breakup of the rental market, but in exact terms they 





Table 5: Independent Variables 
Variable Source Description Included in Regression? 
Urban Census Bureau’s 
MAF/TIGER geographic 
database, 2019 
Dummy variable, tracts that 
intersect with census-defined 
cities marked as “1” 
Excluded from GWR analysis 
because dummy variables 
disallowed. 
Median home value ACS 2015-2019, B25075 Median property value  
Median rent ACS 2015-2019, B25064 Median gross rent  
Median year built ACS 2015-2019, B25037 
(B25036 as supplement) 
Median year that rental units 
were built, or all housing units if 
former unavailable 
 
Percent multifamily units ACS 2015-2019, B25024 Multifamily units divided by all 
occupied units 
 
Percent manufactured units ACS 2015-2019, B25024 Mobile home units divided by 
all occupied units 
 
Percent habitability issues CHAS 2013-2017, table 11 
estimate 46 
Households with at least one of 
the housing problems recorded 
by CHAS divided by all 
occupied units 
 
Vacancy rate ACS 2015-2019, B25002 Vacate units divided by all units  
Seasonal vacancy rate ACS 2015-2019, B25004 Seasonally vacate units divided 
by all units 
 
Percent evictions filed by 
corporations 
South Carolina Judicial 
Branch Court Administration 
(SCJBCA) 
Evictions filed by corporations 
divided by all evictions filed 
 
Percent evictions filed by 
individuals 
SCJBCA Evictions filed by individuals 
divided by all evictions filed 
Excluded from regression due 
to multicollinearity 
Percent evictions by LIHTC SCJBCA, LIHTC records 
from the South Carolina 
housing Finance Authority 
Evictions filed by LIHTC 
properties divided by all 
evictions filed 
 
Percent evictions filed by 
public housing 
SCJBCA, public housing 
records from HUD 
Evictions filed by public housing 
divided by all evictions filed 
 
Total renter households ACS 2015-2019, B25003 Occupied rental units  
Density ACS 2015-2019, B01003 Population divided by area  
Percent single-mother 
households 
ACS 2015-2019, B11001 Households with female 
householder, no husband present 
divided by all households 
 
Percent population black ACS 2015-2019, B02009 Black population divided by 
total population 
 
Percent population Hispanic ACS 2015-2019, B03002 Latino/Hispanic population 
divided by total population 
 
Percent population under 18 ACS 2015-2019, B01001 Individuals under 18 divided by 
total population 
 
Percent population 25+ with 
bachelor’s degree 
ACS 2015-2019, B15003 Adults over 25 with a bachelor's 
or higher divided by adults over 
25 
 
Percent population 25+ 
without high school diploma 
ACS 2015-2019, B15003 Adults over 25 without a high 
school diploma divided by adults 
over 25 
Excluded from regression due 
to multicollinearity 
Poverty rate ACS 2015-2019, B17002 Individuals below the poverty 
line divided by total population 
 
Percent extremely low 
income 
CHAS 2013-2017, table 7 
estimate 134 
Renter households below 30% 
Area Median Income (AMI) 
divided by renter households 
Excluded from regression due 
to multicollinearity 
Percent very low income CHAS 2013-2017, table 7 
estimates 134 and 160 
Renter households below 50% 
AMI divided by renter 
households 
Excluded from regression due 
to multicollinearity 
Percent low income CHAS 2013-2017, table 7 
estimates 134, 160, and 186 
Renter households below 80% 
AMI divided by renter 
households 
 
Median income ACS 2015-2019, B19013 Median household income in the 





The first round of analysis examined the correlation between each of the 26 variables and the filing 
count. Correlational analysis is important because it allows us to understand these relationships 
separately from one another. The independent variables were standardized by z-score to make the 
outputs easier to interpret.  
Table 6: Correlational Analysis Results 
Independent Variable Pearson’s Coefficient Level of 
Significance 
Urban  0.2712 *** 
Median home value — 0.1256 *** 
Median rent — 0.0042  
Median year built  0.0927  ** 
Percent multifamily units  0.4269 *** 
Percent manufactured units — 0.2018 *** 
Percent habitability issues  0.1370 *** 
Vacancy rate — 0.1238 *** 
Seasonal vacancy rate — 0.2420 *** 
Percent evictions filed by corporations  0.4159 *** 
Percent evictions filed by individuals — 0.4658 *** 
Percent evictions filed by LIHTC  0.1382 *** 
Percent evictions filed by public housing  0.0693 * 
Total renter households  0.7246 *** 
Density  0.2353 *** 
Percent single-mother households  0.3151 *** 
Percent population black  0.3090 *** 
Percent population Hispanic  0.1796 *** 
Percent population under 18  0.1800 *** 
Percent population 25+ without high school diploma  0.0883 ** 
Percent population 25+ with bachelor’s degree — 0.0834 ** 
Poverty rate  0.1905 *** 
Percent extremely low income  0.0314  
Percent very low income — 0.0783 ** 
Percent low income — 0.1631 *** 
Median income — 0.1910 *** 




Almost all of the variables tested (24 out of 26) were shown to have a statistically significant 
correlation with eviction filings (Table 6). Of these, 19 were significant at the p < .001 level. The 
correlational analysis confirms the relationships that have been found in previous research, with a 
few notable exceptions. Important positive factors include the number of renter households, percent 
black, and urbanity. Important negative factors are fewer in number but include seasonal vacancy 
and median income. The correlational analysis confirms that landlord characteristics as 
operationalized are significant correlates of eviction filings—individuals are less likely to evict 
than corporations. The effect of subsidized housing is smaller, but still positive. It appears that 
evictions are more common in neighborhoods with a high portion of multifamily housing as 
opposed to neighborhoods with more manufactured housing. The statistical insignificance of 
median rent is the result of a nonlinear relationship with eviction filings. As can be seen in Figure 
7, the highest number of filings actually occur at middling rents. This is a phenomenon previously 
observed by Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond (2020) when they examined the relationship between 
serial filing rate and median rent on a nationwide level. One possible explanation is that tenants in 
mid-range rental markets are able to struggle on for more months than the poorest renters, who will 
be removed after a single missed payment (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020).  
Figure 7: Linear vs Polynomial Regression of Median Rent and Eviction Filings 
 










-3 -1 1 3 5
Median Rent














For the other insignificant variable, percent extremely low income, adding another term does not 
improve the analysis by nearly as much (Figure 8). Visually, it is hard to identify any relationship 
between extremely low income and filings except among outlying tracts, where it is negative.  
Figure 8: Linear vs Polynomial Regression of % Extremely Low Income and Eviction 
Filings 
 
Figure 11 (see Appendix) is a comprehensive list of the other variables graphed against filings. 
With the exception of median rent and percent of the population 25+ with a bachelor’s degree, there 
was no significant improvement to the model by adding a second term. For this reason, it was not 
judged important to account for nonlinearity in this paper.  
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The second stage of the analysis was to model eviction filings using negative binomial regression 
(NBNR). The most common linear regression model is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); however, 
NBNR is better suited to count data where the variance is greater than the mean, as it is in this 
dataset. NBNR corrects for this overdispersion in part by taking the log of the dependent variable. 
As noted, several variables were expected to be collinear with one another. To identify 
multicollinearity, the R package “car” was used to calculate Variable Inflation Factors (VIF). 
Multicollinearity occurs when one of the independent variables can be explained with some 
combination of the other independent variables. If a variable is significantly collinear with other 
variables, it should be removed for parsimony and to maintain the integrity of the regression model. 
A VIF greater than 4 is considered marginally or highly collinear (see Table 7). To minimize 
multicollinearity, the least significant variable of any multicollinear group was eliminated first. For 
example, the two education variables were collinear, so percent without a high school diploma was 
removed because it was less significant in the regression analysis. This method led me to remove 
(in stages) the percent evictions filed by individuals, percent population 25+ without high school 
diploma, percent extremely low income, percent very low income, and median income. Once these 
variables had been removed, multicollinearity disappeared.  
Table 7: VIF Test for Multicollinearity 
Percent evictions filed by corporations 2296.7 
Percent evictions filed by individuals 2175.6 
Percent evictions filed by LIHTC 420.3 
Percent evictions filed by public housing 328.5 
Percent very low income 12.3 
Median income 7.6 
Percent extremely low income 6.3 
Percent low income 6.0 
Percent population 25+ with bachelor’s degree 5.9 
Percent population 25+ without high school diploma 3.8 
Percent single-mother households 3.7 
Percent multifamily units 3.6 
Poverty rate 3.6 
Median home value 3.5 
Percent population black 2.9 
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Percent mobile units 2.9 
Median rent 2.3 
Total renter households 2.2 
Density 2.1 
Vacancy rate 2.1 
Percent population under 18 2.0 
Percent habitability issues 1.7 
Seasonal vacancy rate 1.7 
Percent population Hispanic 1.6 
Urban 1.4 
Median year built 1.2 
 
The R package “MASS” was used to fit the NBNR equation and “MuMIn” was used to calculate 
the corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICc); the overall results can be seen in Table 8. It 
should be noted that NBNR does not create an exact equivalent for the R2 generated with OLS 
regression. The closest approximation is the percentage of the null deviance explained by the 
model, in this case .782 or 78.2 percent. In order to compare with the GWR model, AICc will be 
used. AICc is a statistic used to compare models’ “efficiency” at predicting the true values. It 
prefers more accurate models that use fewer variables.   
Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression Overall Results 
Null deviance 5453.4 on 1096 degrees of freedom 
Residual deviance 1190.3 on 1075 degrees of freedom 
AICc 11192 
Theta 3.790 
Standard Error 0.173 
2 x log-likelihood -11144 
Number of observations 1097 
Out of twenty-one variables in the model, sixteen were significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level (see Table 9). Of these, percent of the population 25+ with a bachelor’s degree, poverty rate, 
percent low income, percent Hispanic, seasonal vacancy rate, and median rent were negatively 
associated with filings. Urbanity, the median year built, percent manufactured units, percent filed 
by corporations, percent filed by LIHTC, percent filed by public housing, percent with habitability 
issues, total renter households, density, and percent under 18 had positive coefficients. The 
variables have been standardized by z-score, so the coefficients indicate the effect of a one standard 
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deviation change in the independent variable on the logs of the predicted eviction filing counts, 
while other variables are held constant. Surprisingly, the coefficient of the percent of evictions filed 
by corporations was larger than the coefficient for the number of renter households. The latter 
relationship was still statistically stronger (see z-scores), but this speaks to the importance of 
landlord characteristics. In fact, considering the strong significance of percent filed by the two 
forms of subsidized housing as well, landlord characteristics in this study were by far the strongest 
of the four factor-clusters. 
Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression Variable Results 
Variable  Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z value Significance 
Urban  0.0899 0.0387 2.32 * 
Median home value — 0.0418 0.0313 -1.34  
Median rent — 0.0641 0.0224 -2.85 ** 
Median year built  0.0149 0.0017 8.80 *** 
Percent multifamily units — 0.0295 0.0295 -1.00  
Percent manufactured units  0.1091 0.0269 4.07 *** 
Percent habitability issues  0.1414 0.0233 6.06 *** 
Vacancy rate  0.0334 0.0246 1.36  
Seasonal vacancy rate — 0.1254 0.0215 -5.85 *** 
Percent filed by corporations  0.5671 0.0261 21.70 *** 
Percent filed by LIHTC   0.2261 0.0184 12.30 *** 
Percent filed by public housing  0.2340 0.0189 12.35 *** 
Total renter households  0.5649 0.0230 24.56 *** 
Density  0.0498 0.0238 2.10 * 
Percent single-mother households  0.0573 0.0313 1.83  
Percent population black  0.0266 0.0270 0.99  
Percent population Hispanic — 0.0445 0.0187 -2.39 * 
Percent population under 18  0.1311 0.0229 5.72 *** 
Percent population 25+ with 
bachelor’s degree 
— 0.2759 0.0338 -8.17 *** 
Poverty rate — 0.1202 0.0262 -4.60 *** 
Percent low income — 0.0985 0.0274 -3.59 *** 





These results can help us understand the hot and cold spots identified above. The concentration of 
hot spots in cities and suburbs is associated with the comparable concentration of corporate 
managers there (see Appendix, Figure 21). Corporate managers naturally operate most in the areas 
with the highest demand for rental housing and thus the largest properties and highest profit 
margins. Urbanity and density also have independent positive effects, indicating that even non-
corporate landlords are more likely to file in cities, where they can expect to fill vacancies more 
quickly. The other landlord characteristics variables, percent filed by public housing and percent 
filed by LIHTC, are also significant and positive. As seen in the analysis of evictor types, subsidized 
housing does not insulate renters from eviction. The overall importance of landlord characteristics 
emphasizes the importance of landlord choice in filing evictions. It should direct the attention of 
policymakers to better regulating large corporate filers.  
High seasonal vacancy rates (see Appendix, Figure 20), such as in coastal markets or near Lakes 
Keowee and Murray, are associated with fewer filings. This may be related to the predominance of 
vacation rentals in those areas, although it is unclear why this would decrease the total number of 
filings rather than just the filing rate. Potentially, seasonal vacancy is acting as a proxy for an 
unknown causal variable related to vacation areas. If rental housing is being marketed to 
vacationers, for example, it may push working-class renters to commute in from elsewhere. In the 
Charleston metro, the hot spot in North Charleston appears to justify this explanation. In other 
coastal areas, commuters may live in more rural areas, where eviction filings may be suppressed 
for other reasons (like less concentrated demand). That said, these are still hypotheses that require 
more research to investigate. 
One surprising result was the lack of significance of percent black. At first glance, this appears to 
fly in the face of a decade of research on this topic (e.g., Huk and Harwood 2019; Immergluck et 
al. 2019; Medina et al. 2020; Merritt and Farnworth 2020; Taylor 2020; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, 
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Gromis, et al. 2021). This is not completely unprecedented: other studies on eviction have failed or 
had ambiguous results in establishing a link to race (Greenberg, Gershenson, and Desmond 2016; 
Desmond and Gershenson 2017; Goodspeed et al. 2021). And it should be noted that this study 
does not attempt to look at individual causes for eviction, only factors on a neighborhood scale. 
But if race is truly not a strong neighbor-level factor in South Carolina once other variables are 
accounted for, what are the implications? Racial disparities in eviction are a fact (Desmond 2012), 
validated by the correlational analysis. Perhaps the racialization of housing in South Carolina is 
more systemic and generational than personal and immediate. Percent black did not exhibit as high 
levels of multicollinearity as observed elsewhere, but this may manifest at the neighborhood level 
in disproportionate poverty, poor-quality housing, and other forms of concentrated disadvantage. 
(Goodspeed et al. 2021). Black tenants may face less individualized bigotry because they are more 
likely to have a landlord of the same race compared to Hispanic tenants (Greenberg, Gershenson, 
and Desmond 2016). In majority-minority neighborhoods, which are common in South Carolina, 
racist landlords might be less motivated to evict black tenants, since they will expect black tenants 
to replace them (Desmond and Gershenson 2017). These explanations, or others, require further 
testing and elaboration before any can be accepted as fact. And if shown to be accurate for South 
Carolina, they will not immediately be applicable to other states or regions without duplicating the 
results there as well. As the following geographically weighted regression model confirms, the 




Geographically Weighted Regression 
Eviction filing rates are a spatial phenomenon. The next part of this paper tries to improve our 
understanding of eviction with a geographically weighted regression model (GWR). Because “there 
is currently no consensus on how to assess confidence in the coefficients from a GWR model” 
(Esri), I only used the variables found to be significant in the linear regression stage. The urban 
dummy variable was excluded because dummy variables are not allowed in GWR. Using ArcGIS 
Pro, static parameters were set as the Poisson distribution model (the same as for NBNR) and the 
Gaussian definition of the kernel (i.e., the area used to optimize each local regression model). Using 
a Gaussian kernel means that even tracts outside of the defined neighborhood will be given a slight 
weight when optimizing the regression equation. This allows the model to look at small 
neighborhood sizes (e.g., 20 tracts) while avoiding overfitting. The other parameters used to define 
the size of the kernel were tweaked to minimize the AICc and multicollinearity, with the nearest 
20 census tracts used in the final analysis. 
In addition to generating the coefficient rasters, I wanted to test the hypothesis that the magnitude 
of variables’ effects on the predicted eviction filing counts will vary spatially, the null hypothesis 
being that these magnitudes will be constant or random. If the null is true, we should expect to see 
the GWR be no more effective than linear regression at explaining the null deviance. If the GWR 
model efficiently explains a significantly greater portion of the null deviance, the null hypothesis 
will have to be rejected.  
Comparing the GWR and non-spatial models, the results are somewhat ambiguous (Table 10, cf. 
Table 8). On one hand, GWR is able to predict significantly more of the deviance, in fact, over 92 
percent. But the AICc of the spatial model was more than three higher than that of the linear model, 
indicating that these improvements were inefficient. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. It 
remains to be shown whether a GWR model can efficiently improve on a global model. 
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Table 10: Geographically Weighted Regression Model Results 
Number of features  1097 
Deviance explained by the non-spatial model 79.01%14 
Deviance explained by the spatial model 92.27% 
Deviance explained by the spatial vs non-spatial model 0.6315 
AICc 14229 
S2 4606 
S2 MLE 47816 
Effective degrees of freedom 11388 
 
To test whether any major spatial variables had been missed by this model, a hot spot analysis and 
spatial autocorrelation test were run on the residuals. The hot and cold spots visible in Figure 9 
represent areas where the GWR model either over- or under-predicted the actual number of filings. 
To improve the model, future research may want to examine these areas and the factors that may 
have been missed there. But the low z score of the global Moran’s i means that the possibility that 
these remaining clusters are due to spatial randomness cannot be ruled out (Table 11). 
 
14 This is the value generated by ArcGIS. There is a slight discrepancy between it and the value reported for 
NBNR in the previous section, probably due to slight differences in the ways R and ArcGIS fit the model. 
Table 11: Spatial Autocorrelation Report 
Moran’s i -0.0121 
Z Score -1.2779 
P Value  0.2012 
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Figure 9: Hotspot Map of the GWR Deviance Residuals at 20 Nearest Neighbors 
 
 
Although it cannot be proven to be the optimal model, GWR’s coefficient rasters still offer a unique 
way to analyze how the causes of the eviction crisis vary between similarly vulnerable locations 
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Some of the rasters simply confirm what was shown in the global model. Variables such as percent 
population under 18 and total renter households had very consistent effects across the map. Other 
rasters reveal patterns not visible in the global model but identified in other sections of this paper. 
For example, the nonlinearity of median rent manifests spatially: in an area where rents are lower, 
such as Spartanburg/Gaffney, rents are positively related to filings. In areas with higher rents, like 
Myrtle Beach, the relationship is reversed. Cherokee County (home to Gaffney) stands out for the 
Percent Low Income 
Poverty Rate Percent Population 25+ with bachelor’s 
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strong relationship between evictions by public housing and more filings overall, consistent with 
the LHA’s startling proclivity to evict.  
But the most important rasters are those that demonstrate unexpected or novel relationships. These 
GWR coefficient rasters allow us to understand how housing markets are distinguished in terms of 
what underlies their local eviction crises. For example, in contrast with Gaffney and Spartanburg, 
the percent of evictions filed by public housing was actually negatively associated with overall 
filings in North Charleston and Myrtle Beach. This suggests that housing authorities in these 
locations may actually be sheltering their residents from eviction in the way that would be hoped 
(or at least, they are less eviction prone than other forms of housing). LHA managers in Gaffney, 
Spartanburg, or Florence might benefit from using the policies of North Charleston or Myrtle Beach 
as a model for reforming their own.  
Density is a more important positive factor in the Pee Dee than it is in other areas, suggesting a 
sharper contrast between the crisis in cities and in rural areas. Given the downtown cold spots and 
suburban hot spots observed in the hot spot analysis, one might expect the major metros to see this 
relationship reversed. But in most of them, the effect of density is small. Only in Spartanburg and 
Myrtle Beach is the relationship between density and filings clearly negative. The reasons for this 
become clearer when examining a population density map of the major metros. Rather than a clear 
peak in the downtown, these metros have population concentrations in the suburbs just as often, 
centered around suburban apartments. 
When compared with more general analyses of a local housing market, GWR rasters allow us to fit 
eviction into that larger picture. For example, Beaufort County is clearly distinct from its 
surroundings. Here, manufactured housing and subsidized housing are more strongly related to 
filings than they are elsewhere. Educational attainment has an unusually high negative effect on 
filings, while the number of renter households had shockingly little effect. These findings 
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harmonize with what scholars have learned about the local housing market. Historically, the 
predominantly black working-class has lived in low-density rural areas, often on heirs’ property, 
and the affordable rental units that do exist are mostly manufactured housing or LIHTC (Finewood 
2012; Dubose 2018; Grady 2019). Geographic isolation has historically made formal education a 
particularly strong marker of class (DuBose 2018). Since the 1950s and 60s, development has 
largely been oriented towards tourists and retirees seeking high levels of amenities, and many 
wealthy neighborhoods have been built physically distant from working-class communities 
(Finewood 2012; Dubose 2018). This, combined with high construction costs, has meant that any 
affordable or subsidized housing is excluded from these census tracts (Grady 2019). Eviction is 
less common in Beaufort (compared to the rest of the state) because the reproduction of the working 
poor as a labor source is no longer as essential as it once was (Soederberg 2018; Finewood 2012). 
Instead, capital seeks to use other tools of state power—rezoning, highway construction, and 
appropriation of heirs’ property—to repurpose the land they live on (Finewood 2012). 
This descriptive analysis shows how GWR rasters help us fit eviction into the local dynamics of a 
housing market. By comparing GWR rasters to descriptions of the local housing market, 




Limitations and Potential Improvements 
As noted in the discussion of the GWR results, this study was not able to show this method to be 
more efficient than nonspatial regression in terms of AICc. However, the amount of deviance 
explained by the GWR model suggests that this is still a worthwhile area of exploration for future 
research. By choosing slightly better independent variables, taking more aggressive measures to 
reduce multicollinearity, and tweaking the definition of spatial relationships, I believe it will be 
possible for future researchers to establish GWR as a superior method of accounting for spatial 
variation in the model. As it stands, researchers can still utilize coefficient mapping to better 
understand eviction within local housing markets.  
There are also some important caveats regarding this study’s methodology. Researchers have 
recently become more aware of the challenges causes by unreliable eviction data, and this study 
was not immune to them (Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020). Court records limited me to using 
eviction filings rather than counts of actual set-outs or involuntary displacement generally. 
Moreover, I was not able to account for commercial or serial evictions because the court data 
received did not contain defendant names. Ideally, because commercial evictions are not part of the 
housing crisis, they should not be included in an analysis of residential evictions. Thankfully, they 
make up less than 2 percent of eviction filings and therefore will have had little impact on the 
overall findings (Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020; Desmond et al. 2016). The inclusion of serial 
evictions is a more serious problem, because research has shown just how common that type of 
eviction is in South Carolina (Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020). The final major limitation was 
the inability to account for changes in property ownership. There were some apartments that 
changed management during the study period (2015-2020), and this report did not attempt to 
separate filings by earlier managers during the cleaning of property owner names. In future studies, 
it would be ideal to develop a methodology that can consistently determine when property 
management changes. However, the obvious source, deeds, usually only indicate ownership, not 
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management. Newspaper records and apartment websites can offer details about management, but 
these are less reliable, not universally available, and generally require painstaking manual searches 
to find the desired information.  
While conducting this analysis, I became aware that while my understanding of eviction was 
grounded in the radical tradition, the methodology of my research itself was not consistent with 
that worldview. While this thesis may contribute to the academic world’s understanding of the 
geography of eviction, it is limited in its immediate usefulness to the tenants’ movement. It shares 
more in common with research aimed towards policymakers, not activists. If we as researchers are 
convinced that eviction is worth stopping, we must reorient ourselves away from birds-eye-views 
like the one presented here and involve ourselves in the world of tenant organizing (Howell and 
Teresa 2020). The Anti-Eviction Mapping Project is an inspiring example of the role that 
researchers can play if they choose to do so (Maharawal and McElroy 2017). There is no shortage 
of research to be done on landlords’ evolving eviction tactics and what tenants are doing the resist 
them (Huq and Harwood 2019). In the latter respect, there is much that tenant organizers in the 
United States could learn from those in the Global South (Miraftab 2006; Chiumbu 2012; Dekel 
2020). Spreading the word about aggressive new strategies, embedding themselves within existing 
tenants’ movements, and focusing as much on praxis as on theory—this is where the future of 




Conclusion and the Path Forward 
To conclude, I want to reflect on how the eviction crisis can be addressed. This thesis gives 
examples of how an understanding of the eviction landscape in South Carolina can justify certain 
policy interventions, but these are very limited in scope. Humanitarian reforms coming from 
policymakers cannot eliminate eviction because landlords would not allow it. The interests of 
landlords and the interests of tenants are not divergent, they are in fact oppositional (Marx 1976; 
Brenner 1977). Landlords have a monopoly on land, meaning that as a group they have a right to 
control who has access to land or housing (Marx 1976; Smith 1979). This gives them an incentive 
to charge rent to anyone who wants to access land that the landlord is not currently using themselves 
(Engels 2009; Soederberg 2018). But tenants, who lack land but still require shelter to survive, have 
an interest in retaining as much of their income as possible. Each dollar the landlord manages to 
extract in rent is a dollar they lose, and vice versa. Landlords are only able to enforce their 
monopoly on land through coercive means, namely, eviction.  
If eviction is not acceptable as a means, perhaps we need to evaluate rent extraction as an end. What 
would the world look like without rent extraction? First of all, without the coercive power to 
perpetuate the exploitation of tenants by landlords means that landlords will cease to exist 
(Kropotkin 1906). Without the ability to extract rent, landlords will lose their right to extract rent. 
With landlords and evictions gone, there would be three main challenges: maintaining housing, 
building new housing, and securing individuals’ private access to their homes (Kropotkin 1906; 
Ferreri and Vidal 2021). The question of maintenance is easy enough for detached dwellings—with 
no more need to pay their landlords’ salaries, tenants will find it much easier to pay for the upkeep 
of their own homes. For larger buildings, where many maintenance problems are shared, the 
problem becomes trickier. Co-operatives and state subsidies are both possibilities, each with their 
own issues (Horlitz 2013; Ferreri and Vidal 2021). Experimentation will ultimately be the best way 
to find the right solution. In regards to who will finance new construction, the state is the most 
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obvious candidate. At our current historical moment, it seems that only the state has the financial 
power to build housing on the necessary scale (Ferreri and Vidal 2021). But this will run into issues 
such as NIMBYism, resource segregation, and the domination of local governments by corporate 
regimes. Here, we can turn the decades of literature on radical and participatory planning to show 
us a path to a true democratization of housing (e.g., Arnstein 1969). 
This radical solution to the eviction crisis is obviously not novel, but it is important to repeat it 
here. Much of the recent wave of eviction literature—whether radical or not—has been primarily 
aimed at policymakers or other researchers (cf., Sims 2016; Schmidt 2017; Soederberg 2018; 
Summers 2019; Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). The former is subject to the many practical 
constraints of public administration (Svara 1985), while the latter is already fully aware of what the 
radical critique is. When solutions have been proposed, they are mostly limited in scope and 
underwhelming in their objectives. If we desire to shift the scholarly focus towards explicitly 
serving the tenants’ movement, it is necessary for our research to continually articulate an end goal. 
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